The impact of distribution channels on the bargaining position of Croatian wine producers by Jana Katunar et al.
561God. XXXIII, BR. 2/2020. str. 561-574
THE IMPACT  
OF DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS  
ON THE BARGAINING POSITION 
OF CROATIAN WINE PRODUCERS
JEL: Q1
Preliminary communication
Received: February 20, 2020
Accepted for publishing: July 30, 2020
Jana Katunar
University of Rijeka




















This paper presents an exploratory study of the relationship between wine producers and distributors in the 
Croatian wine sector. It focuses on the impact of distribution channels on the bargaining position of wine 
producers, thereby adding to the growing body of research seeking to determine the factors that influence 
the growth potential of the traditional agricultural sector. Due to the fragmentation on the production side 
of the market and a high level of concentration on the distribution side, the wine sector provides a suitable 
context for studying the bargaining power of agricultural (wine) producers and hypothesizing on future 
outcomes in terms of industry structure and growth potential. Presuming that the share of value retained 
by the wine producer depends on his bargaining position, two hypotheses were tested: H1: A higher degree 
of self-reliance improves a wine producer’s bargaining position and H2: A higher number of distribution 
channels improves a wine producer’s bargaining position. 
After a brief review of relevant scientific literature, five regression models were created and tested on a 
sample of 124 Croatian wine producers, which yielded statistically significant results confirming the hy-
potheses. The final model controls for production volume, number of labels and respective region. The 
paper ends with some general conclusions and recommendations for future research.
Keywords: Distribution channels, wine producers, market power, bargaining position





Ova licenca dopušta redistribuiranje, komercijalno i nekomercijalno, dokle god se
djelo distribuira cjelovito i u neizmijenjenom obliku, uz isticanje Vašeg autorstva.
Pogledajte sažetak licence (Commons Deed) | Pogledajte Pravni tekst licence
Imenovanje-Nekomercijalno
CC BY-NC
Ova licenca dopušta drugima da remiksiraju, mijenjaju i prerađuju Vaše djelo u
nekomercijalne svrhe. Iako njihova nova djela bazirana na Vašem moraju Vas
navesti kao autora i biti nekomercijalna, ona pritom ne moraju biti licencirana pod
istim uvjetima.
Pogledajte sažetak licence (Commons Deed) | Pogledajte Pravni tekst licence
Imenovanje-Nekomercijalno-Dijeli pod istim uvjetima
CC BY-NC-SA
Ova licenca dopušta drugima da remiksiraju, mijenjaju i prerađuju Vaše djelo u
nekomercijalne svrhe, pod uvjetom da Vas navedu kao autora izvornog djela i
licenciraju svoja djela nastala na bazi Vašeg pod istim uvjetima.
Pogledajte sažetak licence (Commons Deed) | Pogledajte Pravni tekst licence
Imenovanje-Nekomercijalno-Bez prerada
CC BY-NC-ND
Ovo je najrestriktivnija od naših šest osnovnih licenci – dopušta drugima da
O licencima - Creative Commons https://creativecommons.org/licenses/?lang=hr
5 od 6 26. 06. 2017. 12:24
1. Introduction
The paper explores the relationship between wine 
producers and distributors and presents data rel-
evant for understanding the market conditions that 
influence the development of the wine sector in 
Croatia. 
Considering the fragmentation on the production 
side of the market, and high concentration on the 
distribution side, the wine industry is a suitable 
setting for investigating the impact of distribution 
channels on the producers’ bargaining position. 
While many winemakers are small-scale producers, 
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the more ambitious ones among them are seeking 
for ways to develop their business and looking for 
new distribution channels. To keep up production 
levels and enter new markets, they often seek the 
services of specialized distributors possessing spe-
cific knowledge about consumer markets and the 
logistic infrastructure to deliver the product to the 
final buyer. 
The empirical part of this research is based on in-
depth interviews that have been used to establish 
the current Croatian wine producers’ bargaining 
position towards vis-à-vis the distributors. The au-
thors interviewed 124 wine producers, which ac-
count for one quarter of the total number of wine 
producers listed in the Croatian Wine Registry, 
producing wine for commercial purposes; and ap-
proximately one half of all wine producers using the 
services of distributors. Interviews were conducted 
from March to July 2019. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief out-
line of the theoretical background, some facts and 
figures on the Croatian wine industry are provided, 
that set the context for examining the relation-
ship between wine producers and distributors. The 
fourth part of the paper presents model develop-
ment. The fifth part of the paper provides the key 
results of an empirical analysis of the producer-dis-
tributor relationship. The paper ends with a discus-
sion on the findings confirming theoretical expec-
tations, and with a proposal of issues that require 
further research. 
2. Theoretical background
The ideas for structuring this research are drawn 
from market structure and mechanism design the-
ory and, partly, from agency theory, which offer in-
sights into some of the reasons why producers may 
have a problem in controlling the distribution of 
their products. The purpose of intermediaries in a 
distribution channel is to connect the producer and 
the consumer markets. A channel may have several 
intermediaries, forming what theory refers to as a 
vertical chain of interrelated actors. At each stage 
of this chain, a specific bargaining relationship is 
established, determining how the profits within the 
channel are shared among the participants and how 
this affects the price paid by the end consumer. 
The economic theory on vertical relationships relies 
on the explanations of market power. Historically, 
theory was inclined to expect dominant positions 
on the sellers’ side of the market. However, more 
recently, due to the increased importance of mass 
distribution (Allain, 2002), the dominant position 
may have shifted to the distributors’ advantage. It 
is likely that the increase in the number of interme-
diaries has affected the balance of power between 
producers and retailers. More recent research con-
firms that intermediaries have gained stronger bar-
gaining power, even in cases of low market concen-
tration (Haucap et al., 2013; Hayashida, 2018). The 
buyer power of intermediaries in the modern agri-
cultural distribution chain can obstruct the devel-
opment of producers in the wine industry. Battigalli 
et al. (2007) analyzed the impact of buyer power on 
producers’ investment behavior and concluded that 
the bargaining process can affect the producers’ 
motivation to invest in quality. In the longer term, 
increasing buyer power of intermediaries by lower-
ing the profits of producers may increase producer 
concentration (Haucap et al., 2013), leading to low-
er variety and lower service quality.
Due to the imbalances of bargaining power be-
tween contracting parties, unfair trading practices 
can emerge on any side of the retail chain. For some 
products it is likely that producers can achieve a 
better bargaining position as a result of the power 
of their brand and the degree of consumer brand 
loyalty, while in other circumstances intermediaries 
hold a greater bargaining power. The sources of this 
imbalance are diverse and depend on the presence 
of switching costs, informational asymmetry and 
incomplete contracts, and the perishable nature of 
goods (European Commission, 2014)1. Incomplete 
contracts theory sets the basic propositions that 
define the bargaining position of contracting par-
ties under asymmetric market conditions. Accord-
ing to Hart (2017: 1750), “contracts are incomplete 
in reality and contractual incompleteness underlies 
numerous significant phenomena…”. As noted by 
Schmitz (2013: 3), different authors may focus on 
different problems. These phenomena can be ob-
served at the microeconomic level, in setting the 
rules that govern the relationships among parties 
on the market;2 and on the intermediate level of 
industrial organization, especially for regulation 
purposes (market design, vertical agreements). In 
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his Nobel Prize lecture, Hart was mostly focused 
on firm boundaries, i.e. ownership rights (transac-
tion internalization); however, he also mentioned 
“mechanisms design theory” (2017: 1732). Chan et 
al. (2018) explore how information asymmetry be-
tween producer (manufacturer) and retailer influ-
ence contract-format choice by making comparison 
between profits gained within transfer contracts in-
stead of vertical or shared contracts.
Agency theory will expect at least part of this ef-
ficiency to be governed by the quality of control 
instruments applied by those engaging intermedi-
aries, or distributors, as is the case in this research. 
The originators of agency theory, Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976), suggested that whenever there is del-
egation of authority, there will be some loss of value 
due to the differences in motives (interests) of the 
principal and agent. In a situation where an agent 
exploits his position and behaves opportunistical-
ly3, the principal will be deprived of some value that 
would otherwise accrue solely to him (i.e. in cases 
where there are no intermediaries). To prevent 
excessive appropriation of value by the agent, the 
principal will be willing to take some actions (i.e. set 
up system mechanisms) that will limit the possibili-
ties of opportunistic behavior by the agent. These 
actions, whether monitoring or bonding (incen-
tives that might prevent the agent from exploiting 
his position of power), add some costs to the prin-
cipal’s overall costs of doing business. Agency costs, 
when it comes to the relationship of producers and 
distributors, are, in effect, a reflection of market 
positions of different actors along the same value 
chain.4 Researchers that investigated agency rela-
tionship in the buyer-supplier relationship include: 
Mishra et al., 1998; Whipple, Roh, 2010; Steinle et 
al., 2014; Cadot, 2015. They viewed the buyer (cus-
tomer) as a principal who is faced with an informa-
tion asymmetry: inability to evaluate the suppliers’ 
intentions and product/service quality, and oppor-
tunistic behavior of the distributor (agent). In this 
paper, in wine producer – distributor relationship, 
the wine producer is perceived as the principal who 
creates a product and uses the services of distribu-
tors (agents) to gain access to the market. 
With the increase in production, each producer is 
faced with a decision on distribution of additional 
quantities. Deciding how many and which distri-
bution channels to use is strategically as important 
as product development and production itself (Ka-
lubanga et al., 2012). The decision to increase the 
number of distribution channels requires signifi-
cant financial investment and also economic analy-
sis to examine the cost effectiveness and to exploit 
the potential benefits of a larger number of distri-
bution channels.
3. The Croatian wine sector 
Wine production stands out in Croatian agricul-
ture, being a traditional culture with large poten-
tial for branding Croatia as a tourist destination. 
Employment in the wine sector is substantial, and 
so are the returns generated by the industry. After 
a period of expansion, the sector is at a crossroad, 
trying to identify opportunities for future growth. 
Both geographical position and political and eco-
nomic context have a big influence on different 
sectors (Sokolic et al., 2014; Kastelan Mrak et al., 
2016). The same applies to the viticulture and wine 
production. While geographical features are im-
portant because the possibility for grape growing 
depends on the quality of land, economic charac-
teristics, especially tourism, divide wine regions 
into those that have tourism as a “natural” distri-
bution channel (Adriatic region) and the ones that 
do not so they have to think of a different way to 
place their products on the market (Continental re-
gion). Each wine region has a significant number of 
wine producers who produce the same wine type 
and use the same technological processes, leading 
to intense competition among producers also at the 
regional level.
According to the Paying Agency for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Rural Development5, on December 
31, 2018 there were 38,475 registered wine pro-
ducers in Croatia, the total area under vines was 
19,409 ha, while the reported production for 2017 
was 575,939.75 hl. Given that only 1,648 companies 
submitted a request for placing wine on the market, 
that would be the probable number of commercial 
producers, while the rest produce wine for their 
own needs. Chart 1 shows the distribution of pro-
duction relative to the size of area under vines on 
December 31, 2018. The data presented helped to 
estimate the actual population size of this research, 
or more concretely, how many wine producers use 
the services of a distributor.
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According to the information obtained from wine 
producers during interviews, producers who pro-
duce less than 40,000 liters, which implies cultiva-
tion of about 5 ha in Adriatic Croatia and about 6.5 
ha in Continental Croatia, mainly do not use the 
services of a distributor, but rather sell their prod-
ucts through their own shops and distribute their 
products themselves. Based on the data in the pre-
vious chart, 0.9% or about 345 wine producers cul-
tivate over 5 ha, so our estimation is that between 
200 and 250 wine producers use the services of a 
distributor, and are thus the subject of this research.
There is a trend of increasing the share of quality and 
premium wine segment in Croatia. Its share in total 
production increased from 68% in 2009 to 81% 2018. 
The share of premium wine doubled, while the share 
of quality wine increased by 15%, which indicates 
changes in consumer demand (www.apprrr.hr). 
The following Chart (Chart 2) shows wine con-
sumption trend in Croatia.
Chart 1 Distribution of production according to the size of area under vines on December 31, 2018 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation according to data from the 2018 Vineyard register, available at: www.apprrr.hr
Chart 2 Wine consumption trends in Croatia in the period from 2000 to 2017
Source: Authors’ calculation according to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics6
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Most of the wine Croatia imports comes from Mac-
edonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Croatia 
exports wine mainly to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Germany (Čačić et al., 2010). The increase in imports 
is the result of increased market demand (imports 
compensate for a low yield) and increased tourist de-
mand (which cannot be met in the short term). This 
has caused imports to increase by 100% in the last 
10 years. Wine exports is decreasing because Croa-
tia does not produce enough wine to meet domes-
tic market needs, and the degree of self-sufficiency 
is decreasing - it was lower than 80% in 2016/2017 
(CBS). Considering the small quantities potentially 
available for exports, and due to land constraints and 
labor force shortages, significant export growth is 
not expected in the near future.
The last 25 years have been marked by political, 
technological and social changes that have facili-
tated the development of the private sector. Similar 
market dynamics have also affected wine produc-
tion and wine distribution, resulting in a growing 
number, scaling in size and differentiation in qual-
ity of today’s operating companies. EU funding has 
enabled wine producers to modernize production 
equipment, thereby improving wine quality. To 
continue the positive trends, agricultural policy 
should take into account the fact that excessive con-
centration along the distribution chain may cause 
redistribution of the new value being created by 
joint efforts of wine producers and public authori-
ties that support the sector.
4. Model development
The research was conducted to get a better under-
standing of factors that affect power positions of 
distributors in the market. The factors considered 
in this research are briefly described below. 
4.1 Variables
An effective distribution range gives the producer 
access to the market (clearance), and can also ren-
der competitive advantage: access to markets he is 
unable to reach on his own, better visibility, lower 
costs, and steady financial performance. If the pro-
ducer wants to have more substantial control of the 
distribution process, he/she will bear the costs of 
warehousing, additional employment, administra-
tion, marketing and logistics, when needed. How-
ever, due to small quantities and varying production 
volume on a year-to-year basis, combined with low 
man-power and investment capacity, the majority 
of wine producers not selling directly from farm 
gate will turn to specialized distributors. Moreover, 
once a larger share of their distribution is taken up 
by specialized distributors, a hold-up problem is 
likely to occur. 
To ensure the distribution of products, wine pro-
ducers may turn to several distribution channels, as 
was observed in this research.
The distribution range (distribution channels) indi-
cates the number of alternative channels available 
for product distribution. In the wine sector, the re-
ported channels of distribution employed by Croa-
tian wine producers include: 
Direct sales (farm gate sales, own shops) 
Sales to tourist industry establishments (HoRe-
Ca - a distribution channel that includes hotels, 
restaurants and catering services) – vertical in-
tegration
Retailers (generalist distribution chains) – ver-
tical integration
Specialized beverage distributors.
Several authors studied the influence of the num-
ber and nature of distribution channels on value-
creation and appropriation. Levary and Mathieu 
(2000) find that distribution through two channels, 
self-controlled and through intermediary, leads to 
increased profits for both parties. Lassar and Kerr 
(1996) argue that the greater the number of distrib-
utors in one area, the greater the loss of control for 
the manufacturer and the possibility of distributor 
opportunistic behavior. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) 
introduce a model that allows the distributor to 
add value to the product and thus differentiate the 
product from the product directly sold by the man-
ufacturer in order to prevent manufacturer-distrib-
utor conflict. Vinhas and Heide (2014) investigate 
how opening manufacturer own sales channels 
affects the opportunistic behavior of distributors, 
and conclude that increasing competition, caused 
by manufacturer opening own sales channels, in-
creases the opportunistic behavior of distributors, 
but also provides benefits for customers. Adimo 
and Osodo (2017) conclude that distribution dif-
ferentiation increases sales, revenues and market 
share at the micro location. Research has also been 
dedicated to online sales, as a special distribution 
channel. Yan and Bhatnagar (2008) compared on-
line sales and distributor sales and concluded that 
the type of product had a significant impact on the 
financial performance of a distribution channel. 
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Yan shows that concerns about unfair distribution 
of profits may be two-sided. His 2011 paper argues 
that selling products directly through online sales 
exacerbates the conflict between manufacturer and 
distributor because the distributor believes that 
a part of the profit is being stolen from him. This 
finding suggests that the fairness of the distribution 
of profits may be a matter of perception.
Based on the results of previous research, the ex-
pectation in this research was that the higher the 
number of distribution channels employed by the 
wine producer, the better his bargaining position. 
It is also expected that a decrease in the depend-
ence on the distributor, which is measured by the 
ratio of the percentage of sales through own shops 
compared to the percentage of sales through inter-
mediaries, will improve the bargaining position of 
wine producers. According to the analyzed sam-
ple, the wine producers manage to sell only 20% of 
their production to the final customer through their 
own shops, while 80% of their production reaches 
the final customer through intermediaries, mostly 
through the distributor (40.6%). 
Previous research provided the basis and motiva-
tion for exploring how the number of distribution 
channels and the dependence on the distributor af-
fect the bargaining position of the wine producer. 
Large margin spreads encountered in the research 
sample raised a question whether the margins ap-
propriated by the agent fairly represent their share 
of contribution in new value creation. The collected 
data indicated a variation in the total intermediar-
ies’ margin, spanning from 31% to 67% of the final 
price at the end market; implying that at least a part 
of this spread7 may be the result of unequal bargain-
ing position of individual wine producers that con-
tract the services of a distributor. 
This observation leads to the principal hypothesis: 
the share of value retained by the wine producer 
depends on his bargaining position. A better bar-
gaining position, measured by the producer’s share 
in the retail price would reflect a higher participa-
tion in the total value generated.
In this research, a wine producer’s bargaining posi-
tion is seen as being influenced by two factors: the 
number of distribution channels employed (related 
to the possibility to choose the most efficient chan-
nel; the possibility for distributors to compete on 
the price and quality of the service offered; attenu-
ation of information asymmetry) and a degree of 
dependence (exposure to hold-up problems). 
Thus, two hypotheses were proposed and tested:
H1 A higher degree of self-reliance improves a 
wine producer’s bargaining position
H2 A higher number of distribution channels im-
proves a wine producer’s bargaining position
The research was designed to control for the follow-
ing factors: size (production volume), scope (num-
ber of labels) and region. The arguments for design-
ing such a model are explained below.
By producing closely related products (wine labels) 
and increasing production volumes, the average 
cost of production is reduced (economies of scope 
and scale). The benefits of economies of scope and 
scale are cost savings, increased competitiveness and 
better utilization of management skills and sales net-
work, all of which strengthen the bargaining power 
of a wine producer vis-à-vis the intermediaries (Ve-
lázquez et al., 2017). The intermediaries are willing 
to accept lower margins in order to be competitive in 
the wine market. Because of the above, the indicators 
of company size (production volume and number of 
labels) are control variables in this paper.
Many researchers have examined the impact of the 
region of origin of wine on the purchasing deci-
sions, which is also expected to affect the bargain-
ing position of the wine producer. In their study on 
a sample of 352 Australian wine consumers, Mc-
Cutcheon et al. (2009), as well as Chamorro and 
Garcia-Galan (2015) who used a sample of 427 
Spanish wine consumers, concluded that, in addi-
tion to the quality, price and type of wine, the de-
cision to buy wine is also influenced by the region 
of origin. Čop et al. (2019) conducted a survey of 
business performance of wine producers in the 
Adriatic and Continental Croatia on a sample of 95 
wineries, and concluded that the region had no sig-
nificant impact on the operations of Croatian win-
eries. Given that their research was conducted on 
a sample including only limited liability companies 
and public limited companies, which account for 
only about 1.1% of the total number of registered 
larger wine producers in Croatia, a similar survey 
was conducted on a sample of 124 wine producers 
(Katunar, 2019), where all wine producers, regard-
less of the type and size of business (small, medium 
and large), were represented. Katunar concluded 
that there is a correlation between the region and 
selected indicators of winemakers’ business, and 
that wine producers from Adriatic Croatia achieve 
better business results than wine producers from 
the Continental region. This finding supported the 
decision to include the region of origin as a control 
variable in this paper. The variables used in this 
study are explained in the following table.
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MRG Intermediaries margin serves as an indicator of the bargaining position of the 
wine producer. It is calculated as the difference between the price for the dis-
tributor and the average retail price, and expressed as a % of the retail price
NUMBER OF 
CHANNELS
NRCH Number of channels is the number of distribution channels that wine producers 
use to reach the final consumer
INTERMEDIARIES DISTR Intermediaries is calculated as a percentage of production that wine producer 








NRL Size of a wine producer expressed as the number of wine labels (economies of 
scope) 
REGION REG Region of origin: Adriatic and Continental
Source: Authors
4.2  Research instrument
The research instrument was set up according to 
the research hypotheses. The questionnaire, which 
was the basis for conducting in-depth interviews, 
was used to collect empirical data. 124 wine pro-
ducers were interviewed at 7 wine fairs, from 
March to July 2019. The interviews lasted approxi-
mately 25 minutes. The questionnaire consisted of 
45 questions divided into 4 groups. The first set of 
questions comprised general information about the 
wine producing entities. The second and the third 
set of questions were used in qualitative and quan-
titative analysis. The fourth set of questions encour-
aged the wine producers to express their opinions 
and views on particular issues, which was essential 
for the interpretation of the results. 
4.3  Sample
During the data collection phase, 124 wine produc-
ers were interviewed. These producers cultivate 
5,300 ha of vineyards. Given that according to the 
data of the Vineyards Register, there were 19,409 ha 
under vineyards in Croatia in 2018, the observed 
sample covers over 25% of the total Croatian wine 
industry, and about 50% of wine producers sell at 
least part of their production to final customers 
through intermediaries. Table 2 shows the share of 
the interviewed producers in the total number of 
registered wine producing entities, along with the 
share in the total area under vines. Table 3 presents 
data on the types of businesses in the Croatian wine 
industry and in the sample. 
Table 2 Share of wine producers and of the area under vines in Croatia and in the sample by regions
Wine region
Share of wine 
producers in Croatia  
(%)




vines in Croatia 
(%)
Share in the 
sample (%) 
(n=124)
Slavonia and Danube Region 34.37 21 39.25 56.4
Central Croatia 25.49 24,2 12.11 19.8
Dalmatia 32.11 17,7 32.27 11.2
Croatian Istria and Kvarner 8.03 37,1 16.37 12.6
TOTAL 100%8 100% 100%9 100%
Source: Authors’ calculation based on conducted interviews
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Although 97.6% of the total number of registered 
wine companies are family-run agricultural busi-
nesses (Wine register 2018), this number cannot 
be considered relevant as a number of commercial 
wine producers, since the majority of family-run 
agricultural businesses are engaged in agriculture 
for their own needs. 
5. Results of empirical analysis
This part of the paper presents descriptive statistics 
and correlation analysis, followed by five regression 
models and a final regression model. 
Table 3 Share of wine producers in the total number of entities in Croatia and in the sample by type of 
business
 Type of business Share in total no. of business entities in Croatia (%)
Share in the sample (%) 
 (n=124)
Sole proprietorship 1.2 21.8
Family-run agricultural business 97.6 31.5
Cooperative 0.1 2.4
Limited liability company (llc) 1.0 38.7
Public limited company (plc) 0.1 5.6
 TOTAL 100% 100%
Source: Authors’ calculation based on conducted interviews
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
INTERMEDIARIES MARGIN MRG 124 31 67 45.04 6.58
NUMBER OF CHANNELS NRCH  124 1 4 2.82 0.77
INTERMEDIARES DISTR 124 10 100 79.72 19.39
SIZE (PRODUCTION VOLUME) PV 124 8.000 9.000.000 316.209,7 1051232.
SIZE (NUMBER OF LABELS) NRL  124 2 45 9.73 6.36
REGION REG  124 0 1 0.56 0.49
Source: Authors’ calculation
Table 5 Correlation analysis – Spearman test (n=124)
Correlation MRG NRCH DISTR PV NRL REG
MRG 1.000000
NRCH  -0.283097 1.000000
DISTR 0.276268 -0.357623 1.000000
PV 0.044178 0.302128 0.096213 1.000000
NRL  -0.184226 0.267302 -0.035857 0.584387 1.000000
REG  -0.346928 0.397209 -0.239824 -0.119360 -0.082405 1.000000
Source: Authors’ calculation
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Table 6 shows 5 models of the influence of distribu-
tion channels on the bargaining position of Croa-
tian wine producers. The number of entities includ-
ed in research is 124. The first 2 models ((1) and (2)) 
are tested with single linear regression. According 
to results for model (1) and model (2), the influence 
of the independent variable (number of channels 
(model (1)) and intermediaries (model (2)) on the 
dependent variable (margin) is statistically signifi-
cant (p<0.01) confirming the hypotheses tested in 
this paper. 
According to the interpretation of the results ob-
tained, an increase in the number of distribution 
channels by one distribution channel reduces the 
intermediaries margin by 2.28%, i.e. improves the 
bargaining position of wine producers. Increasing 
wine producers’ dependence on intermediaries by 
10% increases the intermediary margin by 0.82%, i.e. 
weakens the bargaining power of wine producers. 
Models (3), (4) and (5) include control variables 
(production volume expressed in liters, number of 
labels, and region). 
The final model (model (5) was developed and test-
ed by multiple linear regression.
The estimated regression equation of the given 
model (5) is:
MARGIN =  45.19 – 0.76 NR OF CHANNELS + 
0.06 INTERMEDIARIES – 6.72E-07 
PRODUCTION VOLUME – 0.06 NR 
OF LABELS – 3.37 REGION
In the final model, independent variable DISTR 
(intermediaries) and control variable REG (region) 
are statistically significant (p<0.05). The value of R2 
of 0.125 in the final model indicates that 12.5% of 
the variation of the dependent variable is explained 
by the variations of the independent variables. In-
creasing wine producers’ dependence on interme-
diaries by 10% increases the intermediary margin 
by 0.6%, i.e. weakens the bargaining position of 
wine producers. 
After estimation of models (3), (4) and (5), diagnos-
tic tests were conducted for multicollinearity using 
Variance Inflation Factors and heteroscedasticity 
(White test).













Coeff. -2.28 -1.84 -1.80 -0.76
Std. Error (0.739) (0.761) (0.792) (0.870)
p-value (0.003)* (0.017)** (0.025)** (0.381)
DISTR
Coeff. 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
Std. Error (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
p-value (0.007)* (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.050)**
PV
Coeff. -3.64E-07 -3.12E-07 -6.27E-07
Std. Error (5.56E-07) (6.29E-07) (6.30E-07)
p-value (0.515) (0.620) (0.2883)
NRL
Coeff. -0.02 -0.06






N 124 124 124 124 124
Adjusted R² 0.065 0.051 0.090 0.083 0.125
*p<0.01, **p<0.05 
Source: Authors’ calculation
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NRCH  1.09 1.17 1.48
DISTR 1.05 1.05 1.06




Table 8 White test
Variable (3) (4) (5)
NRCH 0.2906 0.2114 0.1200
DISTR 0.9961 0.5255 0.7417




According to the VIF factor (Table 7), which is sig-
nificantly below 10, there is no problem of multi-
collinearity. Moreover, given that the p-values of 
the White test (Table 8) are above 0.05, there is no 
problem with heteroscedasticity in the models (3), 
(4) and (5).
6. Discussion and conclusion
Even though the research presented in this paper 
is part of a broader exploration of business policies 
and growth strategies of Croatian wine producers, 
by focusing on the bargaining positions of wine 
producers in the distribution chain, this paper has 
confirmed the presence of power asymmetry be-
tween producers and intermediaries. Thus, it con-
firmed the findings of other authors that a shift of 
market power from the producers to the distribu-
tors is occurring along with the trend of increasing 
importance of mass distribution. 
This paper investigated the role of distribution 
channels and its impact on the bargaining position 
of wine producers, as a weaker contracting party in 
the Croatian wine sector, and provides recommen-
dations for wine producers. The results confirmed 
the importance of managing distribution channels 
on the part of wine producers. The conclusion is 
that a higher degree of self-reliance improves the 
wine producer’s bargaining position. Furthermore, 
the findings suggest that the higher the number of 
distribution channels employed, the stronger the 
wine producer’s bargaining position. The research 
model also controlled for production volume, num-
ber of labels and region.
Considering that most Croatian wine producers are 
small producers, several additional observations 
have been made. Firstly, small wine producers in 
Croatia do not have direct access to retail chains, 
making them likely to employ distribution servic-
es to reach the retail chain. A second observation 
refers to a characteristic typical of wine produc-
ers – they tend to start as a cottage food operation, 
selling their product at the gate. As their produc-
tion volumes increase, they turn to intermediar-
ies to move their goods to the final user. Howev-
er, it appears that the wine producers that do not 
switch completely to intermediaries, maintain a 
better bargaining position. This was evident from 
the data analyzed - producers with a higher share 
of sales through own shops had a higher share in 
the total margin. This suggests that it is beneficial 
for producers to sell at least part of their product 
range through their own shops. Also, in addition 
to increased bargaining power, selling though own 
shops solves the problem of payment uncertainty 
and enhances cash flow. 
The limitation of the research is its design that was 
adapted to accommodate the data available through 
interviews. Due to the inability to obtain more de-
tailed data, especially financial figures, variables 
were measured by the limited data provided by the 
interviewed wine producers. Recommendations for 
future research include the use of accounting data 
and broadening of data sources: the discussion of 
the results could benefit from the opinions of tour-
ist industry representatives and professional som-
meliers. Moreover, similar research might be con-
ducted on a sample of EU countries to observe their 
distribution strategies and regulatory treatment of 
distribution channels.
There were also problems in proving some appar-
ently common and sound theoretical assumptions, 
such as the influence of size/scale on the producers’ 
bargaining position. Theory assumes that relative 
size should influence the bargaining position, how-
ever, in the analyzed sample, production volumes 
(scale) and number of labels (scope) did not prove 
to be statistically significant factors. One of the pos-
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sible explanations for this finding could lie in the 
fact that even the largest Croatian wine produc-
ers are rather small in comparison to distributors, 
and none of the producers account for a significant 
share in any distributors’ total sales. This finding 
indicates significant market asymmetry favoring 
distributors. However, in order to construct sound 
arguments concerning potential abuses of market 
power (the issue of market regulation was not tak-
en into account in this research), further research 
is required. Some of the issues that should be ex-
plored in future research are market demand trends 
(expansion/contraction), profit margins, as well as 
the cost structures and earning potential of the dis-
tribution side of the market. A portfolio approach 
differentiating producers of different sizes and dif-
ferent business models could be of benefit to both 
wine producers and distributors. Another comple-
mentary approach concerns studying the content 
of contractual arrangements. If some categories of 
wine producers or agricultural producers in general 
can be shown to have some influence on contract 
arrangements, these could be used to put forward 
recommendations for agricultural producers trying 
to develop their business models.
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Endnotes
1 European Commission (2014), “Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail 
Supply Chain”.
2 A contract agreement serves to explicitly stipulate mutual expectations of bargaining parties.
3 Behavior that can lead to a situation of moral hazard, that is, the behavior of the agent that results in less successful business opera-
tions of the company for the owner.
4 Another strand of this research (Katunar, 2019) has demonstrated that those producers that employ assets to monitoring and bon-
ding activities, do enjoy higher shares in the value (selling price) achieved at the end market.
5 Paying Agency for Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development (PAAFRD), Vineyards Register data 2018, available at: https://www.
apprrr.hr/ (Accessed on: December 7, 2019)
6 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, available at: www.dzs.hr (Accessed on: December 5, 2019)
7 The other part of this margin spread represents higher costs of operations, as it should be acknowledged that some wine producers, 
for example, smaller in scale, of lower wine quality, lower brand recognition, may raise the operations’ costs for the distributor. Still, 
with the available data it was impossible to establish the share of justified expansion of the agents share in the final price.
8 According to the Paying Agency for Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development (APPRRR) (Vineyards register) in 2018 there were 
38.475 entities in Croatian wine industry.
9 According to the Paying Agency for Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development (APPRRR) (Vineyards register) in 2018, in Croatian 
wine industry 38.475 entities cultivated 19.409 ha of vineyards.
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Utjecaj distribucijskih kanala  
na pregovaračku poziciju hrvatskih vinara 
Sažetak
Ovaj rad istražuje odnos proizvođača vina i distributera u hrvatskom vinskom sektoru. S obzirom na ra-
stući broj istraživanja koja se bave pokušajem utvrđivanja čimbenika koji utječu na potencijal rasta tradi-
cionalnog poljoprivrednog sektora, u ovom smo se radu usredotočili na pitanje kako distribucijski kanali 
utječu na pregovarački položaj proizvođača vina. Zbog fragmentacije na strani proizvođača i visoke kon-
centracije na strani distributera, smatramo da je vinski sektor pogodan objekt za analizu pregovaračke 
moći poljoprivrednih (vinskih) proizvođača i za spekuliranje o budućim ishodima u kontekstu strukture 
industrije i potencijala rasta. Pretpostavljajući da dio vrijednosti koja ostaje proizvođaču ovisi o njegovom 
pregovaračkom položaju, u radu se ispituju dvije hipoteze: H1 - Viši stupanj prodaje putem vlastitih prodaj-
nih kanala poboljšava pregovarački položaj proizvođača vina i H2 – Veći broj kanala distribucije poboljšava 
pregovarački položaj proizvođača vina. 
Nakon kratkog pregleda relevantne znanstvene literature, na uzorku od 124 hrvatska proizvođača vina 
formira se i ispituje pet regresijskih modela koji pokazuju malu, ali statistički značajnu potvrdu hipoteza. 
Konačni model kontroliran je za količinu proizvodnje, broj etiketa i regiju proizvodnje. Rad završava opće-
nitim zaključcima i preporukama za buduća istraživanja.
Ključne riječi: distribucijski kanali, proizvođači vina, tržišna moć, pregovarački položaj
